Abstract-This work considers the problem of fault localization in transparent optical networks. The aim is to localize singlelink failures by utilizing statistical machine learning techniques trained on data that describe the network state upon current and past failure incidents. In particular, a Gaussian Process (GP) classifier is trained on historical data extracted from the examined network, with the goal of modeling and predicting the failure probability of each link therein. To limit the set of suspect links for every failure incident, the proposed approach is complemented with the utilization of a Graph-Based Correlation heuristic. The proposed approach is tested on a dataset generated for an OFDM-based optical network, demonstrating that it achieves a high localization accuracy. The proposed scheme can be used by service providers for reducing the Mean-Time-ToRepair of the failure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In practice, localization of network faults is usually performed by knowledgeable network operations teams, who work with associate on-call engineers to resolve problems in real time with the help of monitoring data. Such an approach can be time consuming; this may be further worsen by monitoring noise and the increasing size of the networks. As the scale of a network grows, automated fault localization becomes increasingly important, since it can reduce MTTR and service disruption.
In optical networks, the failure of a network element can result in the failure of several lightpaths and can, thus, cause huge data losses. This problem becomes more crucial when lightpaths are migrated to high bit rates, such as 40, 100 Gbps and beyond (with the latter being expected to be accommodated in future OFDM-based elastic optical networks). Commonly observed faults in optical networks are caused by fiber cuts, equipment failures, excessive bit errors, and human error. After the detection of a failure, protection/restoration techniques are invoked so that the traffic is recovered prior to the localization and repair of the faulty component [2] - [4] . Most of the existing works deal with the single-link failure scenario, since the occurrence of more than one simultaneous link failures in an optical network is not very common.
In opaque optical networks, it is relatively simple to perform failure detection and localization [11] . However, in transparent optical networks, failure localization becomes a challenging task. Existing fault localization approaches [6] , [11] - [15] , where the term fault may refer to both equipment and/or link failures, assume the use of monitoring equipment for accurately localizing failures. Monitoring equipment is able to send alarms and notifications when the optical signal deviates from its expected value. Thus, failure management relies on the information collected from the network through captured signal alarms. Even though monitoring does not influence optical signal transmission, it is costly, it may result in noisy alarms, it leads to extra bandwidth resource utilization, as well as to additional delay and extra control complexity at the electrical domain.
In this work, we propose localizing single-link failures in transparent optical networks, as accurately as possible, by applying advanced statistical machine learning techniques on historical data that can be found readily available in network management databases, and provide information on the network state upon failure incidents. We assume that a Path Computation Element (PCE) is present (i.e., the ABNO architecture [5] ) that is resource aware and is able to maintain a centralized traffic engineering (TE) database with detailed spectrum availability information. Thus, it is capable of specifying the full details of each link and each lightpath. From this traffic engineering database, information can be extracted and stored in a knowledge database for training/validating/applying the fault localization model proposed. Further, we assume that a failure is detected (at the destination nodes of the established lightpaths) through a number of monitoring alarms capable of identifying, among the established lightpaths, the affected lightpaths. In the data plane, the optical network is considered to be equipped with monitors, e.g., installed in the digital signal processing of the coherent receivers (in a similar manner as the one assumed in [6] ). The affected/unaffected lightpahts can be appropriately correlated for reducing the number of links suspected for causing the failure. As the lightpath correlation procedure may not unambiguously identify the suspect link [6] , a link failure probability is calculated aiming at indicating the truth likelihood of each suspect link to be the faulty link.
The novelty of this work stems from the fact that the proposed fault localization scheme calculates a link failure probability for each one of the links being suspect of causing the failure, aiming at reducing the Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR). In particular, the proposed fault localization scheme consists of two phases: (A) The first phase is activated upon the detection of a failure and consists of correlating the affected and unaffected lightpaths. Similar to [6] , we assume that once a failure is detected, the affected lightpaths are identified according to a number of alarms triggered by the monitoring equipment at the data plane. For the path correlation phase, a Graph-Based Correlation (GBC) heuristic is developed. (B) The second phase is activated only if the GBC heuristic reports that more than one links are suspect for causing the failure. This phase consists of computing a failure probability for each suspect link, aiming at identifying as accurately as possible the failed link. The failure probability is computed by a Gaussian Process (GP) classifier trained on a set that describes past failure incidents. In particular, the GP classifier is trained according to a set that describes both the time dependencies between the successively occurred failures and the network state upon each failure incident.
As the proposed approach targets the accurate localization of the failure, it can be used by service providers for reducing the MTTR, and consequently the human effort required for the identification and repair of the faulty component [2] . The main advantage of the proposed approach is that it does not assume the utilization of any probing lightpaths (extra monitoring equipment), thus reducing the network cost and the control management complexity. For ensuring the network resiliency we assume that a fault protection scheme is invoked immediately after the detection of the failure, independently from the fault localization procedure.
II. APPROACH MOTIVATION
In this work we define as link failure the incident caused by the abnormal operation of a fiber link or any component attached to a fiber link. The proposed fault localization scheme is based on the exploitation of the Mean-Time-BetweenFailures (MTBF). The MTBF is usually modeled by well known distributions, such as the Exponential distribution or the Weibull distribution. Both distributions have a scale parameter describing the MTBF. The Weibull distribution, has also a shape parameter that describes how MTBF changes over time. Thus, the Weibull distribution is also capable of describing the ageing effects of the network components. In this work, and according to [7] , we assume that the MTBF follows the Weibull distribution, with each one of the network links being described by their own scale and shape parameters. In particular, in [7] it was shown that the empirical CDF of the MTBF (of optical network related failures) is well approximated by a Weibull distribution in which the failure rate changes over time. This outcome, was the result of analyzing a dataset consisting of failure information for all links in the continental US for a period of seven months.
Specifically, we generate a dataset of failure information, assuming that the MTBF of each link in the network follows the Weibull distribution. To create a dataset that captures the time dependencies between the successively occurred failures, we count (1) the total number of failures in the network C(i) and (2) the number of failures c j (i) associated with each link e j in the network, up to the last known failure incident i. Then, by dividing c j (i) with C(i), for each incident i, we manage to keep failure information regarding the failure rate of each link, which is relative to the failure rate of the other links in the network. In the dataset we also include information describing the network state upon each incident i (i.e., affected and non affected connections).
Such historical information can then be utilized by a probabilistic model for finding the truth likelihood of a link e j to be the failed link upon incident i. In this work we use a GP classifier for calculating such probability. The class of GPs is one of the most widely used families of stochastic processes for modeling dependent data observed over time. Thus, GPs are useful for sequential data, such as time-series and tracking applications and can be particularly used for active data selection in such systems [8] . GPs constitute one of the most important Bayesian machine learning approaches and are based on a particularly effective method for placing a prior distribution over the space of regression functions. They have a small number of tunable parameters, can be trained on relatively small training sets, and exhibit significant robustness to outliers and the ability to handle sparse data without becoming prone to overtraining. Compared to another popular form of discriminative kernel machines, i.e., the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [9] , GPs possess several advantages, with the most significant being that the GP model produces an output with a clear probabilistic interpretation, providing a measure of uncertainty for the obtained predictions, contrary to SVMs which merely provide point predictions [10] .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The approach assumes a network topology represented by the graph G = (V, E), where V corresponds to the set of network nodes, and E to the set of links in the network. Specifically, we denote E = {e j |j = 1, ..., D}, where D is the total number of links in G. As pointed out, upon a link failure the affected destination nodes will report the abnormal network behavior. Upon failure detection, the Graph-Based Correlation (GBC) heuristic described in detail in Section IV-A is utilized for reducing the number of suspect links in the network. Briefly, the GBC heuristic, upon failure i, takes as input the set of affected paths P (i) and the set of unaffected paths P (i), and through a path correlation procedure returns the set of suspect failed links S(i). Assuming that for every incident i the GBC returns a set S(i) with more than one suspect links, the set S(i) is utilized for creating the observation vector
, if e j ∈ S(i)
c j (i) is the number of times link e j has failed up to incident i − 1, and C(i) is the total number of failures in the system up to incident i, such that C(i) = 
and D j=1 y j (i) = −D + 1, as we are only considering a single-link failure scenario. Thus, a training set D = {(x(i), y(i))}|i = 1, ..., n} is created, with n being the total number of known failure incidents. The dataset D is then utilized for training the used GP classifier, as described in detail in Section IV-B. The generation procedure of the dataset D follows in Section V.
IV. LINK FAILURE LOCALIZATION
As pointed out, a GP classifier is trained with the dataset D for learning to predict the link failures in the network. According to Eq. 1, the creation of dataset D depends on a set of candidates S = {S(i)|i = 1, ....n}, calculated by means of the GBC heuristic. As such, we first describe the GBC heuristic, and then proceed with a brief presentation of the GP classification technique.
A. GBC Heuristic
For the description of the GBC heuristic we define as P (i) = {p m (i)|m = 1, ..., t (i)} the set of unaffected paths upon incident i, and as P (i) = {p m (i)|m = 1, ...t(i)} the set of affected paths upon incident i. Note that a path is considered affected if it passes through the failed link. Otherwise, it is considered unaffected. Additionally, a path is defined as the set of links it traverses. On this basis, the GBC heuristic is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 GBC heuristic
Input: The sets P and P , where P = {P (i)|i = 1, ....n} and P = {P (i)|i = 1, ....n}. Output: The set S, where S = {S(i)|i = 1, ....n}.
1: for i = 1 to n do 2:
The basic idea of the GBC heuristic is to intersect the affected paths in order to get the set of links A(i) that are common to every affected path. If, however, only a single path is affected, then the set A(i) is just the set of links traversing this path. Then, the GBC removes from set A(i) the links that cannot be considered suspect as they also belong to the set of unaffected links A (i). The heuristic terminates by returning the set S(i). Note that GBC assumes that there always exists at least one affected path that triggers the fault localization procedure.
B. GP Classification
If we consider an observation space X , then a GP f (x), where x ∈ X , is defined as a collection of random variables, any finite number of which have a joint Gaussian distribution [16] . A GP is completely defined by its mean function and covariance function. If the mean function for a real process
and
Hence, the GP can be written as
where N (·|µ, Σ) is a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ.
Given the dataset D = {(x(i), y(i))}|i = 1, ..., n}, with the D-dimensional variables x(i) and the targets y(i) defined in Section III, we wish to make predictions for new inputs x( * ) that have not been observed in the training set. In particular, we wish to predict the corresponding outputs y( * ) based on the information contained in the training set D. This, however, corresponds to a multiclass classification problem with D classes. Specifically, each link e j ∈ E is represented by the class j, where j = 1, ..., D. GP classification can then be formulated as either a single GP multiclass classification problem, or as multiple GP binary classification problems; in the latter case, we train D models, where the jth model is trained to recognize the jth class versus all other classes.
In this work, we have formulated the problem according to the GP binary classification in order to avoid the scalability issues that may arise as the network grows. Thus, the dataset D is decomposed into D datasets such that D = {D j |j = 1, ..., D}, where D j = {(x(i), y j (i)}|i = 1, ..., n}. Then, each dataset D j is utilized by a separate binary GP classifier, that produces one probabilistic model for each link in the network. Therefore, in the discussion that follows we focus on the GP-based binary classification problem. Note that for brevity, notation j is omitted in the remainder of this section.
1) Model Formulation and Training: In binary GP classification the postulated model attempts to predict the probability of the dependent variable being "on," i.e., y = 1. Specifically, binary GP classification postulates π(x) p(y = 1|x) = σ(f (x)), where σ(.) is the logistic function, and f (x) is a real-valued latent function that constitutes the main modeling mechanism of the GP classifier. Binary GP classification, being a Bayesian inference approach, proceeds by imposing a Gaussian prior over the inferred latent function f (x), jointly over all the training instances X = {x(i)} n i=1 and the test instance x( * ), yielding
where
and K is the matrix of the covariances between the n training data points usually referred to as the gram matrix (shown in Eq. 8 below).
Note that, in the above equations, k(x(z), x(m)) is the kernel function of the postulated GP model, which expresses the similarity between two data points x(k) and x(l) and takes nonnegative values in R + . In our application, we employ the automatic relevance determination (ARD) kernel [17] . Our selection is due to the capability of the ARD kernel to determine how relevant each input component is, thereby omitting input components that are deemed irrelevant [16] . The ARD kernel reads
Here, θ 0 and {η j } , as discussed in [17] . 2) Prediction Generation: Inference is divided into two steps. First, we use Eq. 6 to derive the posterior distribution of the latent function value corresponding to the given test case p(f ( * )|X, y, x( * )) =ˆp(f ( * )|X, x( * ), f )p(f |X, y)df (10) where we denote y = {y(i)} n i=1 , f = f (X), and f ( * ) = f (x( * )), while
is the posterior over the latent function values on the training data points. Subsequently, we can use this posterior over the latent f ( * ) to produce a probabilistic prediction π p(y( * ) = +1|X, y, x( * )) =ˆσ(f ( * ))p(f ( * )|X, y, x( * ))df ( * ) (12) Note that, for brevity, we denote y = {y(i)} n i=1 , f = f (X), and f ( * ) = f (x( * )). As the integral in Eq. 10 is analytically intractable, we here employ a first-order Taylor expansion of the integral around its mean. This approach, commonly referred to as the Laplace approximation, yields the predictive distribution expression [16] π Eq[π( * )|X, y, x( * ))] =ˆσ(f ( * ))q(f ( * )|X, y, x( * ))df ( * ) (13) where q(f ( * )|X, y, x( * )) is the Gaussian approximation of p(f ( * )|X, y, x( * )) obtained by the Laplace technique; its corresponding mean and variance expressions, E q [f ( * )|X, y, x( * ))] and V q [f ( * )|X, y, x( * ))], respectively, are omitted from here due to space restrictions, but can be found in Eqs. (3.21) and (3.24) of [16] .
V. DATASET GENERATION In this work, the dataset D was generated for an OFDMbased elastic optical network. In general, the dataset generation process of our approach is divided into two phases. In the first phase, a list of sequential, in time, failures is created. Then, these failures are injected into a dynamic Routing and Spectrum Allocation (RSA) system for creating the network incidents from which the network features are extracted.
A. Link Failure Generation
For generating the specific points in time that each link has failed, we assumed that the times between the successive failures of each specific link e j follow the Weibull distribution as explained in Section II. Each link e j , is thus characterized by two parameters, the scale parameter λ j indicating the statistical dispersion of the probability distribution, and the shape parameter β j indicating how quickly the failure rate of the link increases with time. Then, a number of failure times for each link are drawn by L j ∼ W ei(λ j , β j ), where L j is the list in which the failure times of link e j are reported. Once the lists L j are generated, the list L is created by sequentially adding into L the link with the minimum time of occurrence among all the times reported in lists L j . Thus, a list L is created, in which links appear sequentially according to their times of occurrence. Specifically, L = {e k (i)|i = 1, ...., n} and e k (i) ∈ E is the failed link upon incident i.
B. Feature Extraction
Connection requests arrive dynamically into the network according to a Poison process with exponentially distributed holding times. The source-destination pair and the spectrum demand for each connection request are randomly generated. Then, for each request, the RSA algorithm is used for finding a route and a free spectrum allocation for establishing the connection. For the routing sub-problem, Dijkstra's [18] algorithm is used while for the spectrum allocation procedure the first-fit algorithm is utilized. According to the first-fit algorithm, the connection is established on the first free spectrum slots that meet the spectrum continuity and subcarrier consecutiveness constraints [1] . A connection request is accepted into the network if a route is found that meets the the spectrum continuity and sub-carrier consecutiveness constraints; otherwise it is blocked.
As the network evolves, link failures are injected sequentially in order to capture the network state upon their occurrence. In particular, with every arriving request, a singlelink failure is injected, following the sequence of links in list L. Upon the injection of each failure i, the network state is inspected to identify the set of affected paths P (i) and the set of unaffected paths P (i). A counter c j (i) is also kept for each link e j ∈ E and for each incident i, according to Eq. 14:
Finally, the counter C(i) is computed for each incident i as C(i) = C(i − 1) + 1. Then, according to the above procedure, if the number of total incidents is n, the sets P = {P (i)|i = 1, ....n} and P = {P (i)|i = 1, ....n} are generated as inputs to the GBC heuristic, as described in Section IV-A. In addition, the sets C = {C(i)|i = 1, ....n} and c j = {c j (i)|i, j = 1, ....n} are generated and used in conjunction with the GBP output set S = {S(i)|i = 1, ....n} for the creation of the final dataset D = {(x(i), y(i))}|i = 1, ..., n}, as described in Section III.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The network topology of Fig. 1 was utilized for evaluating the proposed fault localization scheme. The exact distances for each link are shown in Table I . For generating the list L, the λ j and β j parameters of the Weibull distribution were generated for each link. In particular, each λ j parameter was generated by multiplying the inverse of the distance of each link with a random number generated by the uniform distribution. This was done in order to assign to each link a scale parameter relevant to its distance (i.e., longer links are expected to fail more frequently than shorter links due to the longer geographical distance that they are spanning and due to the larger number of components expected to be attached to that link). Each β j parameter was generated by multiplying the distance of each e j link to a random number generated by the uniform distribution. To avoid the generation of large shape parameters, that very quickly increase the failure rate, the β j parameters were divided by a large constant number. The parameters used in the simulations are shown in Table I . The dataset D was created by simulating dynamic pointto-point connection requests for three different network scenarios: For a network load of (a) 7, (b) 10, and (c) 20 Erlangs. For all three cases, each spectral slot in the network was set at 12.5 GHz, with each fiber link utilizing 400 slots. Fifteen-thousand (15, 000) connection requests were generated with the connection bandwidth of each request being randomly distributed in the set of bandwidth slots B = {2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 16, 32, 64, 80, 100} . Note that such lightlyloaded networks (7 to 20 Erlangs) were chosen in order to create a large number of network incidents i for which the GBC heuristic returns a set S(i) with more than one suspect links in it (for heavier loads it is expected that the GBC heuristic will succeed to isolate the failed link). The network statistics related with the aforementioned simulation parameters are shown in Table II . In summary, Table II reports that for all network cases, the blocking probability is 0, and that as the network load increases more lightpaths are expected to be simultaneously established on the network upon a failure incidence; that is, as the network load increases, more information is passed to the GBC heuristic for isolating the failed link.
For the creation of the dataset D, 10, 000 failures were injected into the network. Thus, a dataset D was created for n = 10, 000 incidents. The dataset D was then divided into the training dataset D train and into the test dataset D test that is utilized for evaluating the efficiency of the proposed approach. Specifically, the first 7, 000 incidents were utilized for training the GP classifier while the last 3, 000 incidents were kept for evaluation purposes.
As described in Section IV-B, the binary GP classifier was applied to our data and thus the training was performed in a "one versus the others" fashion. Thus, a probabilistic model was computed for each link in the network. In our training example, the training set D train was modified for each link e j ∈ E, in such way that from each D train j the incidents for which only one link was reported as suspect and x j (.) = 0 were removed. The final number of training incidents for each training dataset D train j and for each network scenario examined, are shown in Table III. After the training procedure, the evaluation phase was performed on the D test . Amongst the 3, 000 incidents for which we want to identify the failed link, a number of incidents for which the GBC heuristic accurately identified the failed link, were removed. Information regarding the D test r , which is the set created after the removal of the incidents identified by the GBC heuristic is shown in Table IV. Further, Table IV ated according to each trained link model and the link with the maximum value was chosen as the failed link. Table V summarizes the results. In particular, Table V denotes the GP accuracy for each network load and the total accuracy of the proposed approach; that is, the percentage of all the correctly classified incidents resulting from both the GP classifier and the GBC heuristic over the total number of incidents tested. The results clearly show that the approach achieves an overall high accuracy (93% to 99%), for networks that are lightly loaded (7 to 20 Erlangs). The results, also show that as the load increases the approach accuracy increases significantly. This is the case since the GBC heuristic performs better, as more paths are simultaneously established for correlation. Further, the GP classifier performs better as the average number of suspect links in D test r is reduced (i.e., the uncertainty is reduced). Note that the GP classifier required approximately 1 hour for the training procedure and approximately 1.3 sec to classify a single incident on our MATLAB machine with a CPU @2.60 GHz and 8 GB RAM.
VII. CONCLUSION
A fault localization scheme is proposed that can be used by service providers for reducing the MTTR and the human effort required for fault localization purposes. The proposed fault localization scheme consists of two phases. Once a failure is detected, the GBC heuristic is performed for limiting the number of suspect failed links. Then, if the GBC heuristic returns more than one suspect links, the failure probabilities for each suspect link are generated according to the probabilistic link models computed by a state-of-the-art GP classifier. The proposed scheme achieved a high overall accuracy (reaches 99% for a network load of 20 Erlangs) without utilizing any lightpath probing (extra monitoring equipment). Practical feasibility issues, related to the proposed approach (i.e., how much data is enough for training an accurate data-driven model, how much time it would take for collecting such number of data, scalability of the approach as the network grows), are planned for future work.
